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Civilian anti-drug smuggling efforts thus far have had little impact on the 
supply or price of cocaine inside the United States; users have little difficulty in 
finding an abundant supply at a price they can afford. Public concern over the spread 
of cocaine and crack use and the violence associated with crack prompted the United 
States government to give a major anti-drug war role to the military in 1988. The 
role of the military in the national crusade against illicit drugs had been growing 
since 1981, but the Defense Authorization Act (1988) and the Omnibus Anti-drug 
Act (1988) dramatically increased that role by making the Department of Defense 
the lead agency in the nation's anti-smuggling effort.' The two acts increased the 
military effort beyond anti-smuggling, but this paper will focus on three issues: 
efforts against cocaine smuggling; the likelihood of success; and, finally, the 
potential consequences of military involvement. It will argue that the US Army, 
Navy, and Air Force should not be heavily involved in the campaign against drugs, 
and that such a role is good for neither the United States nor its armed forces. 
THE PROBLEM 
No one knows how much cocaine enters the United States. Published 
statistics are based on estimates of how much coca is being grown in the Andes, 
street prices in selected US cities, amounts confiscated, and the purity of cocaine 
obtained by law enforcement officers. The March, 1991 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report warns, however, that the estimates on coca production are 
imprecise.2 Fluctuations in street price and purity may or may not reflect success in 
anti-smuggling campaigns. Other variables, such as weather, crackdowns by the 
Colombian government, and reorganizations of the cocaine business in South 
America may also account for such changes. In 1989, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) estimated that between 348 and 400 metric tons of cocaine 
hydrochloride were being produced annually in Latin America, most of it destined 
for the American market. That year, DEA announced that over 100 tons were seized 
in 1988 (55 tons by US authorities).3 Therefore, hundreds of tons were unaccounted 
for. A reasonable conclusion is that much of it was introduced successfully into US 
markets, by crossing the Caribbean Basin. 
The fundamental problem faced by anti-drug smuggling units has been 
trying to sort out the drug smugglers from all the "noise" in the Basin. The challenge 
is similar to anti-submarine warfare; the searchers must identify precise "targets" 
against a background of multiple sources of activity, and hence, many possible 
targets. The Basin (the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea) comprises 1,664,500 
square miles, making them equal in size to 46 percent of the land area of the United 
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States. Legitimate cargo or passenger ships might be transporting cocaine without 
the knowledge of the captain or owner. Even small pleasure boats can transport 
valuable amounts of cocaine. Similarly, commercial and private aircraft fly the 
Basin in sufficient numbers to make identification of drug-smuggling aircraft 
difficult.4 
In a perfect world, American anti-drug smuggling forces would know which 
persons or means of conveyance traversing the Basin were carrying illicit drugs and 
know quickly enough to intercept them before they delivered the drugs to the United 
States. Ideally, anti-smuggling operations would detect the presence of the cargo as 
it left its source country. In the real world, however, this is not possible. US 
authorities do not know exactly how the drugs are imported into the United States. 
For example, in 1988, the US government believed that 45 percent of the cocaine 
seized came via private aircraft and over 20 percent of the cocaine seized came by 
private vessels, but both statistics were informed estimates. Neither explained how 
the successfully-smuggled cocaine arrived. The confiscation of twenty tons of 
cocaine from a Los Angeles warehouse in September, 1989 and five and one-half 
from a vessel in the Gulf of Mexico in October of the same year indicated that great 
amounts were getting through. No doubt much of it passed through the Caribbean 
Basin, but by what means? Were the twenty tons flown directly into the United 
States or were they transshipped overland via Mexico? Was it one load or many 
loads? In 1991, the guess was either that cocaine was being transhipped through 
Mexico, whence it travelled overland into the US, or that it entered the US via cargo 
containers. By the time the drugs reached the United States border, the original loads 
from Latin America probably had been subdivided into many loads, making the 
detection and interdiction task extraordinarily difficult. Only the traffickers know 
for sure. 
The presence of sovereign nations in the Basin limits the actions of the US 
government, for this fragmented authority provides fissures through which smug-
glers can slip. Equally important, some of these nations have neither the means nor 
the inclination to patrol their jurisdictions as thoroughly as necessary to prevent 
drug smuggling. Indeed, some were suspected of profiting from the business. As 
Bill Walker points out in his masterful study, Drug Control in the Americas, 
interdiction efforts failed consistently over the years. During alcohol prohibition 
between 1919 and 1933, the US Coast Guard was unable to prevent liquor from 
being smuggled into the United States. Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama were 
transshipment points in the 1930s. In 1932-33, Honduras imported enough mor-
phine to meet its scientific and medical needs for 100 years; in 1934, enough came 
in for another 72 years. Hondurans then shipped this drug to New Orleans, but the 
US Coast Guard, in spite of considerable effort, could not stop this trade.5 In the 
1960s and 1970s, the United States was unable to prevent marijuana smuggling 
even though marijuana more difficult to hide because of its bulk. Cocaine, which has 
high value by volume, can easily be hidden from law enforcement officials. 
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CIVILIAN AGENCIES AND THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ROLE 
US civilian agencies have combatted smuggling since the beginning of the 
Republic. For over two hundred years, the US Coast Guard has been the first line 
of defense against smuggling. Until recent court decisions, the Coast Guard was the 
only US agency with jurisdiction outside the territorial limits of the United States, 
except for territory under military occupation. Coast Guard personnel are trained 
in the necessary investigative and interdiction techniques. With the outlawing of 
most psychotropic drugs by the Harrison Act of 1914, anti-drug smuggling was 
added to the many duties of the Coast Guard, but it had low priority until the 
dramatic increase in drug consumption during the 1960s and only slightly higher 
priority until the cocaine epidemic of the 1980s. The US Customs Service has been 
the second line of defense. Stationed in seaports, international airports, and land 
border crossings, Customs agents have been trained to detect smugglers and 
contraband and either tax or seize the latter. Although the primary mission of the 
Border Patrol has been immigration control, it also conducts anti-smuggling efforts. 
Cocaine smuggling in the late 1970s and in the 1980s overwhelmed all three 
agencies. They did not have the personnel, equipment, and budget to meet the 
challenge, the scale of which had not been anticipated. Instead, the Coast Guard 
budget was actually cut precisely at a time when leaders in Washington were 
asserting that they were stepping up the national anti-drug campaign. Reality and 
rhetoric did not coincide. 
The government therefore, turned to the armed forces in their campaign 
against drugs. There are several reasons for this decision. First, unlike the civilian 
agencies, the Defense Department, until very recently, had the political clout to 
obtain the appropriations necessary to carry out the job. Whereas virtually all 
members of Congress have defense contractors or military bases in their districts 
and could traditionally garner votes by supporting military appropriations, few 
would gain much by supporting the Coast Guard, Customs Service, and Border 
Patrol. Further, since the national anti-drug campaign had been termed a "war," 
many people expected the military to be used, since it has the "war-fighting" 
resources, especially ships and planes. Although the civilian services are just as 
capable, they lacked both that image in the public mind, and the resources. 
After the 1981 amendment of the Posse Comitatus Act to allow DOD to give 
some logistical support to civilian police, the military loaned equipment to civilian 
law enforcement agencies. In subsequent years, as civilian law enforcement 
personnel became less and less able to cope with the drug epidemic, the demand for 
military involvement increased, as did funding for military anti-drug efforts. In 
1982, in Operation BAHAMAS AND TURKS in the Bahamas, the US military first 
began aiding in the suppression of drug activities in the Caribbean. Four years later, 
US military personnel played the major role in planning and conducting Operation 
BLAST FURNACE in Bolivia. As part of Operation SNOWCAP, created in 1987, 
DOD personnel began teaching military skills to Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) agents who were to be stationed in the Andes. 
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Second, so long as the Department of Defense could argue that there was a 
serious threat from the Soviet Union, it could resist most efforts to force it into such 
non-military activities as law enforcement. Until the fall of 1989, the Pentagon had 
argued that its traditional mission of defending the nation against foreign enemies 
was still valid and that using its soldiers, sailors, and pilots in civilian law 
enforcement activities would undermine its military mission.6 With the collapse of 
the Soviet Empire, however, the US military not only lost much of its immediate 
mission (the Gulf War notwithstanding), but also found it more difficult to resist 
civilian demands that it increase its role in the anti-drug campaign. Citizens wanted 
a bigger return on the trillion-plus dollar investment they made in the military in the 
1980s. In 1989, President George Bush and Richard Cheney, his Defense Secretary, 
ordered the military into the fray. Within months, Eastern European nations 
unexpectedly opted out of the Soviet orbit and Americans began hoping for a "peace 
dividend," a dramatic decline in military spending. Fortuitously for the Pentagon, 
the timing of the military commitment to the drug war presented an argument for 
preserving some of the DOD budget. 
Finally, the decision to use the US military was not just caused by the 
inability of civilians to reduce drug smuggling drastically; the military can operate 
in some locales better than civilian agencies. Moreover, military assistance has 
given the US some influence over local militaries. A number of military officers in 
Caribbean Basin countries have received US military aid. In some countries, US 
military personnel work closely with their counterparts. US military bases on the US 
mainland and in the Basin provide valuable platforms from which to operate. Its 
ships and aircraft regularly transit the Basin while its radar devices and intelligence 
satellites capture and transmit information. 
THE NEW MILITARY ROLE 
To detect the aerial and maritime transit of illicit drugs into the United States, 
Congress and the President in 1988 commanded the Pentagon to establish a 
command, control, communications, and technical intelligence (C3I) structure for 
interdiction purposes.7 The goal was to establish a centralized intelligence gather-
ing, analysis and dissemination system that could transmit information in real time 
so that law enforcement personnel could act quickly before the opportunity for 
search, seizure, and arrest disappeared. Intelligence data was to be funnelled into 
centralized databases created by the military and then transmitted to appropriate law 
enforcement agencies of the US and to public security forces of other nations.8 
To detect aircraft DOD adopted a "Defense in Depth" strategy to provide 
blanket radar coverage across the southern US border.9 Partial radar coverage by 
both civilian and military units had been in place for years, but the new radar screen 
coordinates DOD, Coast Guard, Customs, and Federal Aviation Administration 
personnel and equipment to detect potential drug smuggling aircraft within 100 
nautical miles of the land border and 500 nautical miles of the coastline. Headquar-
ters for this effort were established under Coast Guard admirals at Joint Task Force 
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(JTF) 4 in Key West, Florida and JTF 5 in Alameda, California. In addition, the new 
DOD-directed plan is intended to provide detection coverage of known departure 
points and transit routes in the Caribbean, Central America, Gulf of Mexico, 
Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean and the northern areas of South America. Finally, 
both detection systems will be connected through a comprehensive communica-
tions network reaching from Jacksonville, Florida to San Diego, California. 
This "southern fence" uses aerostat radar balloons for southern land and 
maritime borders, mobile seaborne aerostat balloons for natural chokepoints 
between Caribbean land masses, and long-range radar equipped aircraft. In the Gulf 
of Mexico, the Pentagon uses aerostats, coordinated military and civilian radar, and 
fixed-wing aircraft. Under Pentagon auspices, C3I centers are operated across the 
southern United States with facilities in such places as Richmond Heights, Florida, 
Biloxi, Mississippi, Corpus Christi and El Paso, Texas, and Alameda, California. 
The system was to become fully operational in 1992; however, it will increase 
effective detection by only 25 percent.,Q 
Round-the-clock surveillance requires twenty-five E-3 (AWACS) planes in 
five continuous orbits at an approximate annual cost of $248.2 million or forty-eight 
E-2 (AWACS) planes in six continuous orbits at an annual cost of $113.5 million. 
In addition, another $246.4 million would be required for the necessary refuelling 
operations, other fixed wing aircraft, and helicopters. These are small amounts by 
Pentagon standards, but they represent only the beginning. The Pentagon has 
proposed using over-the-horizon radar (originally designed for air defense detec-
tion) to identify drug-smuggling planes. This controversial system, originally 
rejected by Congress, costs $231 million." 
In addition to being designated the key agent in aerial and maritime detection 
in the Basin, the military's interdiction role increased as well. The Posse Comitatus 
Act (1878) forbids military personnel from engaging in civilian law enforcement 
activities, which today includes drug interdiction. The 1988 Defense Appropriation 
Act reasserted that military personnel are not to engage in search, seizure, and arrest 
activities. The conference report accompanying the act explained that Congress 
does not want a radical break with the tradition of keeping the military out of civilian 
law enforcement.12 But military aircraft and vessels can be used in some instances 
to transport civilian law enforcement personnel, and as a base of operations for law 
enforcement efforts outside the United States. For example, Coast Guard personnel 
are sometimes carried on naval ships to do the actual search, seizure, and arrest 
functions. This program, known as Law Enforcement Detachment, was expanded 
in 1988 by requiring that no fewer than 500 Coast Guard personnel, trained in law 
enforcement procedures and armed with arrest powers, be assigned to appropriate 
navy surface ships sailing in drug interdiction areas. However, the captains of these 
naval ships were given prior indemnification from civil or criminal liability if they 
fire upon or sink a suspected vessel in the course of an anti-drug search or seizure.'3 
That certainly approaches granting them police powers, since police have the 
authority to shoot at fleeing suspects. 
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The Pentagon shows little enthusiasm for participation in this new role. 
Many officers prefer to spend money on maintaining traditional military activities 
and on sophisticated weapons systems. They obey the orders of their civilian 
superiors, but continue to warn that military efforts are not the solution to the 
problem. Not all agreed, however. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), based in 
Panama, saw the military's new role as a boon. General Maxwell Thurman, 
SOUTHCOM commander in 1989-91, argued that the Latin American drug war "is 
the only war we've got."14 
Special Operations Forces (SOFs) might view the detection and surveillance 
of civilian aircraft, boats, and ships as useful training for low-intensity conflict, 
since the irregular forces they are likely to fight will use whatever means available. 
But, most LICs occur on land, not at sea, limiting the utility of maritime interdiction 
as training for the kinds of problems likely to be faced by the SOFs. Anti-drug 
smuggling efforts along the US-Mexican border more closely resembles the kinds 
of situations likely to be faced by these soldiers, but neither the US nor the Mexican 
government has given the military the free rein it enjoys during a real war. Thus, 
military officials realize that their participation in the anti-drug campaign in the 
Caribbean Basin provides limited benefit to their goal of maintaining a strong 
military capable of fulfilling traditional military missions. 
ASSESSMENT 
Will interdiction work; will it significantly reduce the supply of illicit drugs 
in the United States? The Pentagon and the General Accounting Office do not think 
so. Peter Reuter, the principal economist studying the issue, argues that even if non-
land smuggling routes became high risk, the retail price of cocaine would only 
increase three percent and smugglers would change techniques or shift routes to 
meet the challenge. If this were to occur, the military role in the anti-drug campaign 
would have to increase as a countermeasure.15 
Even with enhanced resources, interdiction efforts can achieve only limited 
success. This is certainly one meaning of the National Drug Control Strategy report 
when it says "indeed, our recent experiences with drug interdiction have persua-
sively demonstrated that interdiction alone cannot prevent the entry of drugs, or 
fully deter traffickers and their organizations."16 By 1991, the totality of US 
interdiction efforts spurred the smugglers to shift some of their routes through 
Mexico or via the Pacific, or to hide cocaine inside legitimate cargo or both. The 
smugglers have shown that they can outmanoeuvre the law enforcers in spite of the 
latter's high technology. The smugglers themselves also use high technology and 
have the comparative advantage because they comprise such a diffuse target in such 
a large area.17 
There are inherent dangers in the military's C3I anti-drug role. The easiest, 
and thus most probable, technique for collecting intelligence data is to gather as 
much as possible and sort it out later. All kinds of data on the movement of people, 
goods, and transportation craft will be fed into gigantic computer banks and shared 
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by military and civilian officials. Inevitably, some of the data collected and 
disseminated will inevitably be about honest people. Such databanks are insecure; 
although it is illegal to do so, some policemen have used the national crime 
databanks to obtain information about third parties for police colleagues. Such 
sharing of information is dangerous to civil liberties. 
Increasing military power in civilian affairs is politically dangerous both in 
the United States and in Latin America. The very fact that military forces are being 
used for civilian law enforcement is an admission of failure by the civilian 
government. This is particularly true for the United States with its historic tradition 
of keeping the military out of civilian affairs. Civilian law enforcement agencies 
such as the Coast Guard did not fail; they were never given the resources to do the 
job. By declaring "war" on the narcotics problem, political leaders took the route 
of least resistance, and raised unrealistic expectations about what the military could 
accomplish. When the US military is committed to a "war," the American people 
expect results. The political leaders have failed to grasp that illicit drug use is a 
domestic, civilian problem, one wherein free enterprise capitalists are servicing the 
American consumer market. Instead of attacking the root of the problem, they have 
chosen to trim the leaves, thus giving the appearance that the weed is being 
destroyed while actually doing too little to prevent the spreading infestation. 
Although this paper argues generally against the appropriateness of using the 
Defense Department in anti-drug smuggling efforts, there is some merit in favor of 
this role. DOD involvement has made drug trafficking more difficult. Congress and 
the Executive branch may simply be buying time until the drug problem goes away, 
as it has in the past, or citizens quit worrying about it. Citizens have rejected such 
strong measures as zero tolerance or close control of the national borders. The well-
publicized anti-drug-smuggling efforts reassure voters that their government is 
doing something about the problem, but, because these take place outside the US, 
they do not inconvenience these same voters. While waiting for some solution 
exogenous to governmental efforts, the United States is finding means by which to 
keep its military trained in some aspects of the military art. Using sophisticated 
detection technology against real targets is better practice for war than using dummy 
targets. Moreover, the exercise is not wholly without relevance given that the US 
expects that it will deploy its military in the future principally in the Third World, 
not against a major military power. 
In real wars, the military is unleashed like a pit bull and then rechained once 
the conflict is over, but the "drug war" is not a war and will not end quickly. The 
Bush anti-drug strategy, now inherited by the Clinton administration, committed 
the military establishment to performing a civilian function indefinitely. In time, the 
US military could turn the Basin into a domestic lake, as it was earlier in the century. 
If this occurs, the chances that the military will become embroiled in local disputes 
is high.18 If true military emergencies occur, the military anti-smuggling effort 
could not be curtailed. Moreover, the smuggling problem does not just involve 
drugs. Terrorists and weapons also easily enter the country. The nation has little 
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control over its borders and American enterprise is being undercut by smuggled 
goods.19 Does this constitute a threat to national security, and if so, should the 
military be given potential authority over this aspect of civilian commerce? In short, 
it is a small, but significant step from using the military to interdict narcotics traffic 
to extending that role to the wider smuggling problem. 
One solution is for Washington to strengthen the appropriate civilian 
agencies so that they can better accomplish their missions. If the drug problem is 
ever solved, the general smuggling problem will still exist. Building a civilian anti-
smuggling system for the long-term makes more sense than institutionalizing 
border control as a military task. Granted that civilians still control the border, but 
the Pentagon's existing role may prove to be "the thin edge of the wedge." 
Finally, the anti-drug smuggling role of the US military in the Caribbean 
Basin could undermine the military or public support for it. It cannot win this 
pseudo-war. In real wars, the military is given almost unlimited authority to take the 
steps necessary to obtain victory. Officers say that they are capable of doing the job 
but argue that civilians would not like the way they would do it. As Lieutenant 
General Stephen Olmstead, USMC (ret.), former DOD Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Drug Policy and Enforcement, put it, they would use machine guns and not 
worry about Miranda rights. Merchants and tourists would not like the conse-
quences of search techniques implemented at the borders or on the high seas.20 The 
US will not allow the military to act like a military but instead demands that it act 
like a large coast guard. It is expected to fight a "war" that is not a war and which, 
for reasons beyond its control, cannot win. As this becomes apparent, public support 
for the military could decline. If this occurs, at a time when the military's role is 
already being questioned and its budget trimmed in favor of other national priorities, 
the US armed forces may be less capable of responding to a real war. 
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